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a b s t r a c t
There have been limited efforts to evaluate the efficacy of environmentalmanagement pro-
grams, in part because environmental legislation often lacks objective, quantifiable criteria
to use in such assessments. Here we evaluate the ecological outcomes of an important el-
ement of one well-known environmental statute, the US Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA), using take reduction planning as a case study. Take reduction planning is man-
dated by the MMPA as a means to reduce mortality of marine mammals in US fisheries to
below statutory thresholds. We used data from formal Stock Assessment Reports to assess
and rank the success of five Take Reduction Plans (Harbor Porpoise, Bottlenose Dolphin,
Atlantic Large Whale, Pelagic Longline, and Pacific Offshore Cetacean) in mitigating the
bycatch of 15 marine mammal stocks. In general, Take Reduction Plans have had an un-
even record of meeting their statutory requirements. Successful plans were characterized
by straightforward regulations and high rates of compliance. Unsuccessful plans covered
marine mammal–fisheries interactions in the northeastern US, had low compliance with
complex regulations and sometimes focused on very small stocks. This study emphasizes
the importance of requiring legally mandated, quantitative metrics and long-term moni-
toring programs to evaluate the efficacy of a well-known element of an established envi-
ronmental management program.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Government institutions have attempted to address conflicts between the conservation and allocation of natural
resources, mitigate activities that harm human and environmental health, and conserve wildlife and ecosystems by
enacting and implementing environmental legislation. The US alone has passed 20 major federal environmental statutes
(http://www.nrdc.org/reference/laws.asp), and is a signatory or party to 162 international environmental agreements
(http://sedac.ciesin.org/entri/country.jsp). It is clear that some of these laws and agreements have been successful in
mitigating the effects of harmful activities and helped to conserve natural resources but, for several reasons, there have been
fewattempts to formally evaluate the efficacy of such environmental initiatives. First, amonitoring program is required prior
to establishing any environmental intervention to provide a baseline against which to measure impacts (Brogden, 2003;
∗ Correspondence to: Monterey Bay Aquarium, 886 Cannery Row, Monterey, CA 93940, United States. Tel.: +1 252 732 5846.
E-mail addresses: sara.mcdonald@duke.edu, smcdonald@mbayaq.org (S.L. McDonald).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gecco.2015.11.009
2351-9894/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
2 S.L. McDonald et al. / Global Ecology and Conservation 5 (2016) 1–11
Koontz and Thomas, 2006; Newig, 2007; Pullin and Knight, 2009). Often such baseline data do not exist, or if they do, are
not readily accessible. Second, legislation must clearly define measurable objectives that can be used in future evaluation
(Newig, 2007; Dukes, 2005; Weiss, 1972). Third, to account for environmental variability, monitoring must occur over long
time scales, which can be expensive (Brogden, 2003; Koontz and Thomas, 2006). Finally, ecosystem complexity and the
possibility of multiple, simultaneous interventions make it difficult to attribute a change in environmental conditions to
environmental variability or a particular intervention (Brogden, 2003; Koontz and Thomas, 2006; Newig, 2007).
Without a formal evaluation of the efficacy of environmental interventions, however, practitioners may not only waste
time and resources (in the case of ineffective measures), but the unintended consequences of such interventions may cause
more harm than good (Koontz and Thomas, 2006; Pullin and Knight, 2009; Weiss, 1972). In addition, feedback regarding
ecological outcomes of environmental management is the cornerstone of adaptive management. Despite these compelling
reasons, ecological evaluation of conservation management remains in the very early stages (Pullin and Knight, 2009).
With regard to conservation, national and international laws and treaties seldom specify objective, measurable criteria
againstwhichwemay evaluate the efficacy of protectivemeasures. For example the EuropeanUnion’s Habitats Directive, the
principle legislation for wildlife conservation throughout the EU (together with the Birds Directive), lists in its Annexes the
protective status of species (endangered, vulnerable, rare, or endemic). It does not, however, specify any objective criteria
used to classify these species or how a species’ classification may be changed once it is listed (Cardoso, 2012). Similarly,
the US Endangered Species Act (ESA, 16 U.S.C.1531 et seq.) includes five qualitative benchmarks for listing a species as
endangered (‘‘in danger of extinction’’, 16. U.S.C. 1532(6)) or threatened (‘‘likely to becomeendangered’’, 16. U.S.C. 1532(20)),
but does not stipulate any quantitativemeasures (e.g., probability of extinction in a certain number of years) to assign listing
status. Although the ESA requires recovery plans to incorporate ‘‘objective, measurable criteria’’ for removal from the list
or a change in classification (16 U.S.C. 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii)), many species lack recovery plans or the specificity of the criteria
for down-listing or de-listing vary considerably within and among species (Gregory et al., 2013; Gerber, 1998; Gerber and
DeMaster, 1999; Gerber and Hatch, 2002). Thus it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of these recovery plans, or the
conservation actions contained within them.
In contrast, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) employs specific, quantitative criteria to
evaluate the status of species on its Red List. The Canadian Species at Risk Act and the Australian Environment Protection
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 draw on these same,measurable criteria (Mooers et al., 2007; TSSC, 0000; COSEWIC,
0000). Unfortunately, some of the criteria are not easily applicable to some taxa. For example, it is especially difficult to
measure habitat fragmentation, the extent of occurrence, and areas of occupancy of long-lived marine animals that travel
over great distances (Gerber, 1998; Gerber and DeMaster, 1999; Gerber et al., 2000).
1.1. Case study
An important section of the US Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA, 16 U.S.C. 1361 et seq.) provides a unique
opportunity to evaluate its efficacy. It contains quantifiable metrics that aim to reduce the incidental mortality of marine
mammals in fisheries, a process known as bycatch.Marinemammal populations are vulnerable to bycatchmortality because
of their life history characteristics and demography (Lewison et al., 2004; Read, 2008; Read et al., 2006; Soykan et al., 2008).
These species exhibit long lifespans, late ages of maturity, low fecundity, and high survival rates (Heppell et al., 2000, 2005)
and, consequently, are vulnerable to evenmoderate rates of mortality (Lewison et al., 2004; Heppell et al., 2000, 2005). High
bycatch rates can cause marine mammal populations to decline over very short timeframes (Lewison et al., 2004; Taylor
et al., 2000; Wade, 1998).
For small populations of marine mammals, bycatch can be particularly pernicious (Lewison et al., 2004; Read, 2008).
Under these circumstances, even rare bycatch events can adversely affect population viability, especially if the mortality
includes reproductively active females (Read and Wade, 2000). In a large fishery that interacts with a small population of
marine mammals, each fishing vessel’s contact with individual animals will be extremely rare, so protective measures can
be both expensive and politically unpopular (Read, 2008).
Here we present a case study in which we evaluate the ecological outcomes of a process implemented to reduce marine
mammal bycatch in US waters through the development of Take Reduction Plans. Geijer and Read (2013) described an
overall decline in marine mammal bycatch in the US since the implementation of these plans, suggesting that they have
been generally successful in reducing the scale of bycatch in the US. This evaluation builds on the analysis of Geijer and
Read (2013) by comparing ecological outcomes following the implementation of these plans to the criteria mandated under
the MMPA. We create a simple, objective method to evaluate the ecological efficacy of several plans by comparing their
outcomes to the mandates contained in the statute. By examining the history and attributes of each plan, we also propose a
suite of factors that may contribute to their ecological outcomes.
2. Methods
2.1. Theory—case study background
In the US the National Marine Fisheries Service (Service) is charged with protecting cetaceans and most species of
pinnipeds by implementing the MMPA. A unique feature of the MMPA is a formula for estimating the maximum allowable
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number of animals that can be removed from each stock by human-related causes without causing depletion or impeding
recovery, a parameter known as the Potential Biological Removal (PBR). PBR is calculated as the product of the minimum
estimate of the population size (Nmin), one-half of the maximum potential population growth rate (Rmax), and a recovery
factor (Fr ), which considers the status of a population and addresses uncertainty caused by biases in mortality, abundance,
and Rmax. If bycatch of a stock exceeds PBR, the stock is deemed ‘‘strategic’’ (16 U.S.C. 1361(19)). The ‘‘strategic’’ designation
includes stocks listed as endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species Act, depleted under the MMPA, or that
are declining and likely to become endangered or threatened (16 U.S.C. 1362 (19)).
The MMPA also directs the Service to compile a list of commercial fisheries each year based on the frequency and
severity of their interactions with marine mammals: Category I (frequent incidental mortality or serious injury); Category
II (occasional); and Category III (remote likelihood). The Service prepares Stock Assessment Reports for each stock that are
required to contain information on population structure, abundance, trends, and the extent of human-caused mortality
(16 U.S.C. 1387(d)). Regional scientific review groups provide peer-review of the Stock Assessment Reports and make
recommendations about research priorities (Taylor et al., 2000; Read andWade, 2000). If a ‘‘strategic’’ stock interacts with a
Category I or II fishery, the Service must form a multi-stakeholder group of fishermen, researchers, environmentalists, and
state and federal managers, known as a Take Reduction Team (TRT, 16 U.S.C. 1387(f)(6)(A)(i)).
Each TRT is required to create a consensus-based suite of regulations called a Take Reduction Plan (16 U.S.C.
1387(f)(7)(A)(ii)). The immediate goal of each plan is to reduce bycatch to below PBR within the first six months of
implementation (16 U.S.C. 1387(f)(2)). The long-term goal is to reduce bycatch to levels approaching a zero mortality and
serious injury rate, termed a ‘‘zero mortality rate goal’’ (ZMRG), which has been defined as 10% of PBR (50 CFR Section 229).
If the team does not reach consensus, the Service is required to draft a plan that incorporates any consensus-based elements
(16 U.S.C. 1387(f)(7)(A)(ii)).
2.2. Data
Seven Take Reduction Teams (teams) are currently active: Atlantic LargeWhale; Atlantic Trawl Gear; Bottlenose Dolphin;
False Killer Whale; Harbor Porpoise; Pacific Offshore Cetaceans; and Pelagic Longline ( http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/
interactions/trt/teams.htm#gmhp). One team (Atlantic Offshore Cetaceans)disbanded because the fisheries it addressed
were closed by regulation. We extracted data from marine mammal Stock Assessment Reports (SARs) from 1989 to 2013
(http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/sars/species.htm) for 15 stocks that are managed under Take Reduction Plans, and compiled
information on annual bycatch, PBR, ZMRG, and abundance. The data reported in SARs are two years behind their published
date, so data covered by the reports analyzed herein were from 1987 to 2011. The methods we used to collect and analyze
these data are described in detail by Geijer and Read (2013). We extracted annual marine mammal serious injury and
mortality estimates from the section in the SARs entitled ‘‘Annual Human Caused Mortality’’. When no mortality estimate
was available, we used data from other sections of the SARs including observed mortality and serious injuries (see Geijer
and Read, 2013 for a more detailed description).
2.3. Calculation—established plans
Weused twometrics to estimate the efficacy of each plan relative toMMPA goals and to each other. The firstmetric was a
simple determination ofwhether a planwas successful irrespective of statutory deadlines, i.e., weremortality levels reduced
and maintained below PBR or ZMRG. We chose not to use the statutory deadlines laid out in the MMPA because they have
been characterized as unrealistic and as a result, several Take Reduction plans experienced delays throughout the process
(GAO, 2008; RESOLVE, 1999; Young, 2001).Moreover, ecosystemunpredictability and inter-annual variation in fishing effort
may cause bycatch to fluctuate annually and, although bycatch might drop below PBR within six months (or ZMRG in five
years), it could exceed PBR or ZMRG in subsequent years (GAO, 2008). Thus, it is more relevant to ask whether bycatch was
maintained at levels below PBR or ZMRG once achieved than to determine whether statutory deadlines were met. Metric 1
is thus a simple categorical measure of whether bycatch was reduced and maintained below PBR or ZMRG as follows:
−1 = Bycatch > PBR
0 = Bycatch ≤ PBR and > ZMRG, and remained there through 2011
1 = Bycatch ≤ ZMRG, and remained there through 2011.
Stocks where bycatch fluctuated above and below ZMRG were assigned a score of 0, while stocks that fluctuated above
and below PBR were assigned a −1. Ranks of all stocks managed under a single plan were averaged to determine a mean
rank. We excluded stocks that were below ZMRG prior to implementing a plan (Table 1).
Metric 2 was the mean of the annual difference in bycatch from PBR divided by PBR itself.
Metric 2=mean[(PBR-Bycatch)/PBR]
such that: 1.00 implies No bycatch
0.90–0.99 implies ≤ ZMRG (because ZMRG = 10% of PBR)
0.00–0.89 implies > ZMRG and ≤ PBR
<0.00 implies > PBR.
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Table 1
Marine mammal Take Reduction Teams and stocks analyzed herein.
Team Stock
ALWTRT Western North Atlantic right whale
Gulf of Maine humpback whale
Western North Atlantic fin whale
Western NorthAtlantic minke whalea
BDTRT Western North Atlantic Northern Migratory coastalb
Western North Atlantic Southern Migratory coastalb
Northern North Carolina Esturarine (NNCES)
Southern North Carolina Estuarine (SNCES)
Northern South Carolina Estuarine (NSCES)c
Charleston Estuarine (CES)c
Western North Atlantic South Carolina/Georgiac
Northern Georgia/Southern South Carolina Estuarine (NGSSCES)c
Southern Georgia Estuarine Stock (SGES)c
Western North Atlantic Northern Florida Coastc
Western North Atlantic Central Florida coastc
Jacksonville Estuarine (JES)c
Indian River Lagoon Estuarine (IRL)c
Biscayne Bayc
HPTRT Gulf of Maine/Bay of Fundy Harbor Porpoise
POCTRT California/Oregon/Washington Baird’s beaked whalea
California/Oregon/Washington Cuvier’s beaked whalea
California/Oregon/Washington short-finned pilot whale
California/Oregon/Washington sperm whale
California/Oregon/Washington humpback whale
California/Oregon/Washington pygmy sperm whalea
California/Oregon/Washington short-beaked common dolphina
California/Oregon/Washington long-beaked common dolphinb
California/Oregon/Washington northern right whale dolphinb
PLTRT Western North Atlantic short- and long-finned pilot whales
Western North Atlantic Risso’s dolphin
a Not included in analyses because bycatch was< ZMRG prior to the year of plan implementation
and remained there post-implementation.
b Stock is included in analyses because although not strategic (bycatch < PBR), bycatch was
>ZMRG prior to plan implementation.
c Not included in analyses because of insufficient data.
Ranks of all stocksmanaged under a single planwere averaged to determinemean rank and, as above, we excluded stocks
that were below ZMRG prior to implementation of a plan (Table 1).
For both metrics, higher ranks indicated greater success. We calculated ranks for the following plans: Harbor Porpoise,
Atlantic Large Whale, Pelagic Longline, and some stocks managed under the Bottlenose Dolphin and Pacific Offshore
Cetaceans plans. Unfortunately, we were unable to rank several stocks and teams. For example, bycatch levels for all stocks
considered by the Atlantic Trawl Gear team are below PBR, none of the stocks are strategic, nor do they interact with any
Category I fisheries. This teamwas created as the result of a lawsuit brought by environmental groups (Stipulated Settlement
Agreement, 2003). This team created a Take Reduction Strategy rather than a Plan, which is restricted to voluntarymeasures
involving education, outreach, and research (NationalMarine Fisheries Service, 2008, 2012). Secondly, the stocks considered
by the Bottlenose Dolphin Team were redefined in 2010 and data were available for only a few of the newly defined stocks.
The Northern and Southern Coastal Migratory Stocks of bottlenose dolphins are not strategic but were included in the
analyses because bycatch exceeded ZMRG when the plan was created. Moreover, these stocks are susceptible to periodic,
large-scale, unusualmortality events that can decrease abundance and lower PBR. In addition, the Stock Assessment Reports
for the these stocks described bycatch levels in terms of minimum and maximum potential values due to uncertainty
regarding the stock identity of individual dolphins killed in gillnet fisheries. Thus, we conducted separate rankings with
these minimum andmaximum values. The primary fisheries considered by the Atlantic Offshore Cetaceans Team have been
closed, making the plan irrelevant. Finally, the False Killer Whale plan had not been implemented long enough to calculate
ranks for its stocks.
2.4. Calculation—covariates
We gathered information about each team that we hypothesized might influence the ecological outcome for each stock.
These included the following (Table 2): team size (members plus alternates); team age (months); PBR in 2011 for each stock
(averaged for each covered by a plan); the number of amendments to each plan; and geographic region of the team/stocks.
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Table 2
Covariates of Take Reduction Teams and marine mammals stocks that may contribute to their ecological success.
Take Reduction Team and
Affiliated marine mammal
stock
PBR in 2011 BC/PBR Team size
(number of mem-
bers+ alternates)
Team Age
(Years)
Number of Take
Reduction Plan
Amendments
US Geographic
Region
Atlantic Large Whale 3.1 (average of
team stocks)
3.0 82 18.4 28 Northeast
Western North Atlantic Right
Whale
0.9 5.6
Gulf of Maine Humpback
Whale
2.7 3.1
Western North Atlantic Fin
Whale
5.6 0.4
Bottlenose Dolphin 39.6 (average of
team stocks)
0.03–0.27 60 13.1 2 Southeast
Western North Atlantic,
Coastal, Northern Migratorya
86 0–0.01
Western North Atlantic,
Coastal, Southern Migratorya
63 0–0.06
Northern North Carolina
Estuarine System
7.9 0.13–0.38
Southern North Carolina
Estuarine System
1.6 0–0.63
Harbor Porpoise 625 0.35 42 18.9 2 Northeast
Gulf of Maine-Bay of Fundy
Harbor Porpoise
Pacific Offshore Cetacean 45.8 (average of
team stocks)
2.26 17 18.9 2 West
California/Oregon/Washington
SpermWhale
1.5 10.7
California/Oregon/Washington
Short-finned Pilot Whale
4.6 0
California/Oregon/Washington
Humpback Whale
11 0.4
California/Oregon/Washington
Northern Right Whale Dolphin
48 0.15
California/Oregon/Washington
Long-beaked Common Dolphin
164 0.04
Pelagic Longline 143 (average of
team stocks)
1.39 26 9.6 0 Southeast
Western North Atlantic Risso’s
Dolphin
126 1.88
Western North Atlantic Long-
and Short-finned Pilot Whale
159 0.89
a Stocks not strategic.
Team sizes were used as a proxy for the number of fisheries involved in a Take Reduction Plan and were similar relative to
each other with or without the inclusion of alternates. We chose to include alternates because this research was part of a
broader study inwhich alternateswere an important part of the dataset (McDonald and Rigling Gallagher, 2015b;McDonald
and Rigling-Gallagher, 2015a). We chose to look at groups size because as group size increases, trust among participants in
a negotiation and the likelihood of achieving consensus decreases, participant perceptions of outcome efficiency and equity
also decreases, as well as the likelihood of compliance with a consensus-based agreement (Dukes, 2005; Floyd et al., 1996;
Leach, 2006; Holmes and Scoones, 2000; Leach and Sabatier, 2005; Sipe, 1998). Regarding team age, we hypothesized that
older teams have built trust and social capital and thus have more buy-in and compliance with the plan. We chose to look
at PBR because it is much more challenging to reduce bycatch below a PBR that is already extremely low (less than five)
than one that is very high. This could affect the success of a plan. The number of times a plan has been amended could
make it more difficult to implement and enforce, and geographic region could affect myriad ecological variables as well as
socio-economic and cultural norms that might influence fishing effort or compliance with plan requirements. To determine
whether any covariates significantly affected these results, we conducted a multiple regression analysis of the ecological
ranks (metrics 1 and 2) on the independent variables of PBR, US geographic region, and Take Reduction Team size and age
using Mplus (Muthén and Muthén, 1998–2010).
3. Results
3.1. Existing plans
The five planswe assesseddealwith 15marinemammal stocks. Ranks forMetric 1 ranged from−1 to 0.75,while ranks for
Metric 2 ranged from−0.5 to 0.89 (Figs. 1 and 2, Table 3). The two lowest ranking plans (Harbor Porpoise and Atlantic Large
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Fig. 1. Rank scores of marine mammal Take Reduction Plans, Metric 1 by Metric 2.
Fig. 2. Ranks for Metric 2 of marine mammal Take Reduction Plans. Black (<0) = high bycatch (>PBR) and gray (0–0.89) =moderate bycatch (>ZMRG
and<PBR).
Whale) had Metric 1 scores below zero, and the latter had a negative value for Metric 2 (Figs. 1 and 2, Table 3), indicating
that average annual bycatch fluctuated above and below PBR and far exceeded ZMRG. Themost successful plans (Bottlenose
Dolphin and Pacific Offshore Cetaceans) had positive values for the first Metric and scored above 0.5 for Metric 2 (Figs. 1
and 2, Table 3). These plans reduced and sustained bycatch across stocks to below PBR, and at least two stocks from each
maintained bycatch below ZMRG. The high, positive Metric 2 values indicate average annual bycatch was below PBR, and
one was nearly at ZMRG (Fig. 2).
For individual stocks, values for Metric 2 ranged from−1.41 to 0.96 (Fig. 3, Table 3). Five stocks (Gulf of Maine humpback
andNorth Atlantic rightwhales, California/Oregon/Washington spermwhales, Gulf ofMaine-Bay of Fundy harbor porpoises,
and Western North Atlantic long- and short-fin pilot whales) scored −1 for Metric 1, indicating they were above PBR or
fluctuated above and below PBR. Three of those stocks (humpback, right, and sperm whales) had negative values for Metric
2, indicating that average annual bycatch exceeded PBR. The Northern North Carolina Estuarine Stock of bottlenose dolphins
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Table 3
Metric 1 and 2 ranks of marine mammal Take Reduction Plans and stocks.
Take Reduction Team Marine Mammal Stock Metric 1 Metric 2
Rank average[(PBR-BC)/PBR] Interpretation of M2
Harbor Porpoise Gulf of Maine-Bay of Fundy
Harbor Porpoise
−1 0.13 <PBR and>ZMRG
Atlantic Large Whale – −0.67 −0.50 >PBR
Western North Atlantic Right
Whale
−1 −0.94 >PBR
Gulf of Maine Humpback Whale −1 −1.41 >PBR
Western North Atlantic Fin Whale 0 0.84 <PBR and>ZMRG
Pacific Offshore Cetaceans – 0.20 0.51 <PBR and>ZMRG
California/Oregon/Washington
Short-finned Pilot Whale
1 0.54 <PBR and>ZMRG
California/Oregon/Washington
SpermWhale
−1 −0.28 >PBR
California/Oregon/Washington
Humpback Whale
0 0.51 <PBR and>ZMRG
California/Oregon/Washington
Long-beaked Common Dolphin
1 0.87 <PBR and>ZMRG
California/Oregon/Washington
Northern Right Whale Dolphin
0 0.90 =ZMRG
Bottlenose Dolphin—minimum
bycatch estimate
– 0.75 0.89 <PBR and>ZMRG
Western North Atlantic, Coastal,
Northern Migratorya
1 0.96 <ZMRG
Western North Atlantic, Coastal,
Southern Migratorya
1 0.96 <ZMRG
Northern North Carolina
Estuarine System
0 0.76 <PBR and>ZMRG
Southern North Carolina
Estuarine System
1 0.86 <PBR and>ZMRG
Bottlenose Dolphin—maximum
bycatch estimate
– 0.50 0.51
Western North Atlantic, Coastal,
Northern Migratorya
1 0.93 <ZMRG
Western North Atlantic, Coastal,
Southern Migratorya
1 0.74 <PBR and>ZMRG
Northern North Carolina
Estuarine System
0 −0.15 >PBR
Southern North Carolina
Estuarine System
0 0.51 <PBR and>ZMRG
Pelagic Longline – 0.00 0.51 <PBR and>ZMRG
Western North Atlantic Long- and
Short-finned Pilot Whalea
−1 0.07 <PBR and>ZMRG
Western North Atlantic Risso’s
Dolphina
1 0.94 <ZMRG
a Stocks NOT strategic prior to TRT.
(maximum bycatch estimate) also scored negatively for Metric 2 (Fig. 3). Harbor porpoises and pilot whales, meanwhile
scored under 0.5 for Metric 2. Spermwhale bycatch was below ZMRG for nine of 13 years. However, in 2010, it experienced
very high bycatch (16 animals), dramatically affecting its average annual difference from PBR.
Based on Metric 1, management of four stocks can be considered a success, with scores of 1 (bycatch below ZMRG). Two
of these four are managed under the Pacific Offshore Cetaceans plan and two are covered under the Bottlenose Dolphin
plan (Table 3). Bycatch of Pacific short-finned pilot whales was below PBR and ZMRG for all but one-implementation years.
Bycatch of the two-bottlenose dolphin stocks also was below ZMRG for all years but one, while that of long-beaked common
dolphins was below ZMRG for more than 70% of the years following implementation. Five stocks scored 0.9 or above for
Metric 2, indicating their average annual bycatch was at or below ZMRG (Fig. 3). Bycatch of all five stocks was below PBR
when their plans were implemented and for all stocks except the Northern right whale dolphin, was below ZMRG for more
than half of the implementation period.
3.2. Covariates
Team size ranged from 17 to 82 members plus alternates, including alternates (Table 2). The Atlantic Large Whale Team
is the largest and Pacific Offshore Cetaceans the smallest. The youngest team was established in June 2005 and the oldest
two teams were formed in February 1996. Most plans have been amended a few times; the Atlantic Large Whale plan has
been amended 28 times. Mean PBR of each team also varies greatly, ranging from 3.1 to 625. The Western North Atlantic
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Fig. 3. Ranks for Metric 2 of 15 marine mammal stocks managed by Take Reduction Plans. Black (<0)= high bycatch (>PBR) gray (0–0.89) =moderate
bycatch (> ZMRG and< PBR), and white (≥0.9)= low bycatch (≤ZMRG).
Table 4
Regression coefficients for the covariate predictor (northeast US) of Metrics 1 and 2.
Dependent variable Covariate Estimate P-value R2
Metric 1 NE US −1.11 <0.001 0.85Metric 2 −0.76 <0.001 0.76
right whale has the lowest individual PBR (0.9) and the Gulf of Maine-Bay of Fundy harbor porpoise stock has the highest
(625).
US region was a significant covariate of Metrics 1 and 2 with the northeastern US being the least successful (Table 4),
which indicates that plans to regulate stocks in this region of the US (Maine to North Carolina) were less successful at
reducing bycatch than plans created by teams in other regions (Table 4). The northeast accounted for 85% of the variance in
Metric 1 and 76% of the variance in Metric 2.
4. Discussion
Our analysis, which uses data from a long-term monitoring program evaluated against objective, measurable criteria,
suggests that performance of the marine mammal Take Reduction Planning process has been uneven. Only two of the five
plans, the Pacific Offshore Cetaceans and Bottlenose Dolphin plans were successful in meeting at least one statutory goal
(reducing bycatch below PBR or ZMRG) and maintaining these reduced bycatch levels. Following implementation, their
average annual bycatch was consistently below PBR and periodically below ZMRG. By contrast, the Harbor Porpoise and
Atlantic Large Whale plans did not result in reduced bycatch levels. For both plans, bycatch was below PBR for only half of
the years following implementation and was rarely below ZMRG. This variability in ecological success (reduction in bycatch
relative to PBR) also was reflected in the rankings of individual stocks. Nine of the 15 stocks analyzed for this study (Table 1)
can be considered successfully managed, with Metric 1 scores ≥ 0 and high ranks for Metric 2. Five of these stocks had
average annual bycatch levels below ZMRG (Metric 2 ≥ 0.9). Management of bycatch was unsuccessful for five stocks
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because average bycatch for four of these five stocks was above PBR (Metric 2 < 0). Average bycatch of the remaining three
stocks ranged between PBR and ZMRG (Metric 2 ≥ 0 and < 0.9).
4.1. Covariates
The longevity of a plan affected the availability of data for this analysis, but did not affect success. Three plans were
formulated in the mid-1990s but had widely varying degrees of success (Tables 2 and 3).
Teams in the northeastern US were less successful than those in other regions. This likely underscores the importance
of compliance with and enforceability of regulations. For example, the Harbor Porpoise plan (in the northeastern US)
requires the use of acoustic alarms, called pingers, in certain times and areas. When used properly, these devices can reduce
harbor porpoise bycatch by more than 90% (Bache, 2001; Cox et al., 2007; Hardy et al., 2012; Palka et al., 2008). Fisheries
observers monitor compliance with plan measures by recording information about the gear, catch, and bycatch when nets
are retrieved. In 2010 and 2011, Orphanides and Palka (2012) estimated that only 41% of observed hauls were in compliance
with pinger regulations in the Gulf of Maine. Moreover, Palka et al. (2012) documented that the fishery was only 19% in
compliance with other gear requirements in the mid-Atlantic between 2010 and 2012. Geijer and Read (2013) found that
harbor porpoise bycatch prior to implementation of the plan was directly correlated with cod landings in the northeast sink
gillnet fishery. There was a partial de-coupling of the two parameters after the plan was implemented until 2007, indicating
that measures in the plan were successful in reducing harbor porpoise bycatch (Geijer and Read, 2013). However, we found
that from 2008–2012, once again, there was a high correlation between cod landings and bycatch (r = 0.96, p = 0.008).
This suggests that a lack of compliancewith pinger requirements rendered the plan less effective and that variation in fishing
effort was driving recent bycatch levels. Moreover, efforts by fishing industry members to lobby a National Marine Fisheries
Service political appointeewere successful in altering plan regulations and thus undermined the negotiation process (Safina
and Read, 2012; McDonald and Rigling-Gallagher, 2015a).
In contrast to the plans implemented in the northeastern US, compliance with the Pacific Offshore Cetaceans plan
(western US) was excellent. Between 1998 and 2009, Carretta and Barlow (2011) documented that more than 99% of
observed sets in the California drift gillnet fishery used pingers correctly. In addition, there is a high degree of observer
coverage (20% of sets) in the California/Oregon drift gillnet fishery and at least 50% of unobservable vessels are boarded at
sea each year (Long and Fahy, 2012). This high level of observer coverage allows precise estimates of bycatch and provides
a conspicuous enforcement presence that deters violations of plan regulations. The reasons for the large difference in
compliance between the two plans are not understood and worthy of further study.
In addition, poor performance of Take Reduction Plans in the northeastern US alsomay result from low stock sizes, broad
scope of the plan, difficulty reaching consensus, and participants who undermined negotiations (McDonald and Rigling
Gallagher, 2015b; McDonald and Rigling-Gallagher, 2015a). The small sample size of this analysis may not have detected
the influence of these variable statistically, but they are factors that affect the creation and implementation of the plans. For
example, the enormous scope and scale of the Atlantic LargeWhale Teammakes it impractical to monitor compliance using
an observer program. Moreover, the team has never reached consensus, which has confounded the purpose of consensus-
based negotiation and increased the likelihood that the negotiating parties would go outside of the process to achieve their
goals (McDonald and Rigling Gallagher, 2015b;McDonald and Rigling-Gallagher, 2015a; Coglianese, 1997; Funk, 1997). This
plan has spawned five lawsuits and Congressional intervention (Asmustis-Silvia, 2009; Asmutis-Silvia and Young, 2010).
Moreover, the Atlantic Large Whale plan focuses on bycatch from very small, endangered stocks that have very low PBR
values. Perhaps as a result, the team has produced myriad, convoluted amendments to the plan that, so far, have been
unsuccessful in meeting statutory goals.
The MMPA defines conservation targets that scale directly with abundance, so stock size is an important driver of the
likelihood that a plan will meet those targets. Three of the four lowest-ranking stocks had abundance estimates of less than
1000 individuals, resulting in very low PBRs (values < 10). The PBR for right whales is often less than one individual per
year (Table 2). Even under ideal circumstances, reducing bycatch to ZMRG becomes practically impossible for such stocks.
4.2. Caveats
Ourmethodprovides an objectivemeans of evaluating the efficacy of TakeReduction Plans, but data limitations presented
significant challenges to the approach. The data contained in US marine mammal stock assessments vary in amount,
precision, and age (Lewison et al., 2004; Read et al., 2006; Geijer and Read, 2013; GAO, 2008). Abundance estimates older
than eight years are considered unusable because stocks size may have changed over the intervening period. In such cases,
PBR is undefined (Moore and Merrick, 2011). Bycatch estimates are extrapolated from observer programs, when such data
are available, but are negatively biased when derived from logbook and stranding data (Lewison et al., 2004; Read et al.,
2006; Geijer and Read, 2013; National Marine Fisheries Service, 2011). Observer and stock assessment survey programs are
costly and their implementation varies greatly among stocks. Only half of US fisheries are observed, which limits estimation
of bycatch levels and their associated uncertainty (GAO, 2008; National Marine Fisheries Service, 2011). Defining stock
structure also can be challenging, making estimates of abundance, PBR, and bycatch imprecise or biased (Read et al., 2006;
Geijer and Read, 2013). Uncertainty regarding stock boundaries can lead to multiple reconfigurations of stock structure
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over time, as evidenced by bottlenose dolphins in the Atlantic (http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/sars/species.htm). Moreover,
stocks that cross international boundaries may be subject to fishing related threats outside of the jurisdiction of the US.
Take Reduction planning process, which could affect abundance that is used to calculate PBR. Finally, our evaluation was
limited by the number of years of data available following implementation of a plan; due to this limitation, we were unable
to evaluate the False Killer Whale plan altogether.
5. Conclusions
Using the Take Reduction Planning process as a case study, we assessed the conservation effectiveness of a well-
known element of an established US environmental management program under the MMPA. We were able to conduct this
research only because of the existence of data from long-term monitoring of marine mammal stocks contained (and made
publicly available) in the Stock Assessment Reports (http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/sars/species.htm), as well as objective,
measurable criteria that were integrated into the statute. Despite their flaws and inconsistencies, the Stock Assessment
Reports allowed us to assess the conservation efficacy of these plans. This underscores the importance of creating and
maintaining long-term, ecological monitoring programs. Prior to implementation, managers should consider and plan for
the challenges associated with such evaluations. Moreover, this study underscores the value of incorporating objective,
measurable criteria into environmental legislation or agreements that provide goals against which to compare the results.
Other such agreements and legislation like the IUCN redlist, Canadian Species at Risk Act, and the Australian Environment
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 also contain measurable criteria that lend themselves to evaluation of
their conservation efficacy.
Take Reduction Plans have had an uneven record ofmeeting their statutory requirements. Successful planswere typically
drafted by small teams and produced regulations that were readily monitored and enforced, which facilitated compliance.
Unsuccessful plans were produced by large, unwieldy teams, usually in the northeastern US, addressed small stocks and
crafted regulations that were difficult to enforce or were not enforced at all. A comprehensive evaluation of the elements
contributing to the success or failure of Take Reduction Plans will require investigation of the negotiation process, outputs,
socio-political outcomes, and explorations of participant attitudes (McDonald and Rigling Gallagher, 2015b). A comparison
of these social factors with the ecological outcomes presented here is critical to creating a comprehensive evaluation of this
process and for suggesting improvements to this negotiated rulemaking process. Very limited evaluation of such consensus-
based rulemaking processes has been conducted to date and more research is needed to explore whether the factors
associated with ecological effectiveness of this participatory, environmental management process hold in other cases both
within and outside the US.
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